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Constituents of complex systems interact with each other and self-organize to
form complex networks. Empirical results show that the link formation pro-
cess of many real networks follows either the global principle of popularity
or the local principle of similarity or a tradeoff between the two. In partic-
ular, it has been shown that in social networks individuals exhibit significant
homophily when choosing their collaborators. We demonstrate, however, that
in populations in which there is a division of labor, skill complementarity is
an important factor in the formation of socioeconomic networks and an in-
dividual’s choice of collaborators is strongly affected by heterophily. We an-
alyze 124 evolving virtual worlds of a popular “massively multiplayer online
role-playing game” (MMORPG) in which people belong to three different pro-
fessions and are allowed to work and interact with each other in a somewhat
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realistic manner. We find evidence of heterophily in the formation of collabo-
ration networks, where people prefer to forge social ties with people who have
professions different from their own. We then construct an economic model
to quantify the heterophily by assuming that individuals in socioeconomic sys-
tems choose collaborators that are of maximum utility. The results of model
calibration confirm the presence of heterophily. Both empirical analysis and
model calibration show that the heterophilous feature is persistent along the
evolution of virtual worlds. We also find that the degree of complementarity in
virtual societies is positively correlated with their economic output. Our work
sheds new light on the scientific research utility of virtual worlds for studying
human behaviors in complex socioeconomic systems.
Introduction
Complexity emerges in the evolving and self-organizing processes of many natural, social, tech-
nological, and biological systems. The constituents of a complex system interact with each other
and form complex evolving networks, where the constituents are nodes and their interaction re-
lationships are links (1–6). For many real networks, the link formation process follows either
the global principle of popularity in which a node tends to link with high-degree nodes (7,8), or
the local principle of similarity in which a node tends to link with nodes having traits similar to
its own (9), or a tradeoff between them (9).
In the sociological literature the local principle of similarity, i.e., the phenomenon that “birds
of a feather flock together,” is known as homophily (10). There is much empirical evidence in-
dicating that individuals prefer to forge social ties with people whose traits such as education,
race, age, and sex are the same as their own (11–14). Such homophilous behaviors are ubiq-
uitous in social networks and have been well documented (10–12, 14–18). In addition, the
similarity shared by individuals in a group is often a significant predictor of a group’s altruism
level and its ability to cooperate (19). Sociological literature argues that human societies tend to
display two social systems: (i) homophilous, in which people seek out people who are similar,
and (ii) heterophilous, in which people seek out people who are different (20). The evidence
indicating the actual existence of heterophilous societies is rare, however.
In general, it has long been accepted that one of the most significant factors in increasing
productivity in modern human societies has been the division of labor (21). Thus we might
assume that people in modern societies now prefer to forge links or collaborate with those who
have complementary productive skills and that socioeconomic networks are becoming increas-
ingly heterophilous, but no direct evidence of this has been documented. The availability of big
data recorded from massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) enables us
to test social and economic hypotheses and theories—such as this one—in large-scale virtual
populations (22) and gain a deeper understanding of our social and economic behaviors (23–31).
We study the evolving collaboration networks of 124 virtual worlds of a popular MMORPG
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in which the avatars (virtual people) belong to three different professions (warrior, mage and
priest) with different skills. In a virtual world, each avatar can maintain a list of collaborators
and the closeness of each pair of collaborators is quantitatively measured by their mutual inti-
macy. More details about the data are found in Material and Methods and SI text. We find that
avatars prefer to collaborate with others of different professions in these virtual worlds. We then
propose an economic model to quantify the heterophily by assuming that individuals in socioe-
conomic systems choose collaborators that are of maximum utility. Model calibration shows
that the evolving curves preference coefficient γij(t) that quantifies the degree of collaboration
preference from i-avatars to j-avatars are well separated and illustrate remarkable heterophily:
γij(t) > 1 for avatars belonging to two different professions (i 6= j) and γij(t) < 1 for avatars
of the same profession (i = j). We further construct two measures to quantify the degree of
complementarity of virtual societies. We find that social complementarity positively correlates
with economic output.
Results
Empirical analysis
Fig. 1A shows the collaboration networks on day t = 15 of a group of 27 avatars randomly
chosen from a virtual society filtered by three intimacy thresholds Ic = 0, 100, and 2000. There
are 12 warriors, 5 priests, and 10 mages. If i-avatars are homophilous (neutral, heterophilous)
in their collaboration-forging process, the proportion of links between i-avatars is greater than
(equal to, less than) the square of the proportion of i-avatars (0.1975 for warriors, 0.0343 for
priests, and 0.1372 for mages). For Ic = 0, there are 77 links including 15 intra-warrior links,
4 intra-priest links, and 4 intra-mage links. The proportions of intra-profession links are 0.1948
for warriors, 0.0519 for priests, and 0.0519 for mages. For Ic = 100, there are 48 links in-
cluding 8 intra-warrior links, 1 intra-priest link, and 1 intra-mage link. The proportions of
intra-profession links are 0.1667 for warriors, 0.0208 for priests, and 0.0208 for mages. For
Ic = 2000, there are 15 links including only one intra-warrior link and no intra-priest and intra-
mage links. The proportions of intra-profession links are 0.0667 for warriors and 0 for priests
and mages. Hence, the avatars in Fig. 1A are heterophious except for priests when Ic = 0.
We will show below that heterophily is not a specific characteristic for these 27 avatars but a
universal feature present in all the virtual societies.
Consider a society s on day t whose size is the number Ns of s-avatars. The number of
(s, i)-avatars is denoted Ns,i, where i = 1, 2, and 3 stand for the three professions. Hence
Ns =
∑3
i=1Ns,i. The ratio of i-avatars in society s is
ws,i = Ns,i/Ns. (1)
The average number of j-collaborators of an (s, i)-avatar is fs,ij . Hence, the average number
of collaborators that an (s, i)-avatar has is fs,i =
∑3
j=1 fs,ij. The average proportion of j-
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collaborators in all collaborators of an i-avatar is
qs,ij =
fs,ij∑3
j=1 fs,ij
=
fs,ij
fs,i
. (2)
Note that qs,ii is the homophily index (15,32). If i-avatars have zero preference for collaborating
with j-avatars, we have qs,ij = ws,j. If i-avatars prefer to collaborate with j-avatars, we have
qs,ij > ws,j. In this case the i-avatars are homophilous when j = i and the i-avatars are
heterophilous when j 6=i. Fig. 1B shows that when t = 15 and Ic = 100 most virtual societies
have qs,ij > ws,j when i 6= j, but qs,ij < ws,j when i = j. Such heterophilous patterns are
observed for other values of t and Ic as well.
Similar to the inbreeding homophily index (15, 32), we define the collaboration preference
index to be
Ps,ij =
qs,ij − ws,j
1− ws,j
. (3)
Note that Ps,ii is the inbreeding homophily value (15,32). If i-avatars have no preference to col-
laborate with j-avatars, we have Ps,ij = 0. If i-avatars prefer to collaborate with j-avatars, we
have Ps,ij > 0. In the latter case, the i-avatars are homophilous when j = i and heterophilous
when j 6=i. Empirical results show that for most virtual societies Ps,ij > 0 when i 6= j, but
Ps,ij < 0 when i = j (Fig. 1C). Thus in socioeconomic networks the avatars are heterophilous.
Fig. 1D shows the evolution of preference values Pij averaged over all societies on the same
day for Ic = 100. Although these curves exhibit mild trends, it is evident that the heterophilous
feature is persistent as the virtual societies develop.
Quantifying collaboration preference
Viewing virtual worlds as analogous to real societies, an avatar seeks collaborators when she
finds it difficult to complete a task alone. The choice of collaborators has a significant influence
on the completion of the task and it is better to have collaborators with complementary skills.
Hence the number and skill configuration (or distribution) of an avatar’s collaborators are the
main determinants of her utility. If the skill configuration in the collaborator list of an avatar is
optimal, her utility reaches its maximum. If the skill configuration deviates from that optimal
value, her utility is reduced. Taking into account the fact that maintaining a social network
incurs a cost, we propose an economic model for the decision-making process of an avatar to
determine the optimal number of collaborators needed (see Materials and Methods). The model
essentially maximizes the function
Ds,i(fs,i) = (b− c)f
β
s,i − af
α
s,i
[
3∑
j=1
(qs,ij − γijws,j)
2
]α
2
, (4)
where γij is the preference coefficient. If i-avatars prefer to collaborate with j-avatars, γij > 1;
if i-avatars have no preference regarding j-avatars, γij = 1; if i-avatars prefer not to collaborate
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with j-avatars, γij < 1. For {i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3}, if γij > γik, then i-avatars prefer j-avatars
over k-avatars.
To calibrate the model, we follow and further develop an econometric method presented in
Ref. (12) (see Materials and Methods). We obtain the values of γij for each intimacy threshold
Ic on each day t. Fig. 2A shows the evolution of preference coefficients γij for socioeconomic
networks using the intimacy threshold Ic = 100, and Fig. 2B shows the average preference
coefficients over all days. The F -tests presented in Materials and Methods show that all the
results are significant at the 0.1% level.
All the estimated values of the γii coefficients are less than 1, while all the γij values for
i 6= j are greater than 1. This indicates that the avatars are not seeking same-profession avatars
but different-profession avatars and are thus heterophilous. In most cases, especially when the
intimacy threshold Ic is not large, the γij(Ic, t) values do not have a trend along the evolution
of virtual worlds. When Ic is large, however, we observe an increasing trend in γ13(Ic, t) for
Ic = 1000 and 2000, in γ23(Ic, t) for Ic = 1000 and 2000, and in γ32(Ic, t) for Ic = 500, 1000
and 2000. We find that the preference coefficients might change with the increase of Ic. For
warriors, γ11 and γ13 decreases, while γ12 increases. For priests, γ21 increases, γ22 does not
exhibit evident trend, while γ23 decreases. For warriors, γ31 increases, γ32 decreases, while γ12
increases for large Ic values.
There are also intriguing patterns of relative collaboration preference as quantified by γij −
γik where i, j and k correspond to the three professions (Fig. 2B). On average, warriors prefer
priests over mages and this relative preference enhances when Ic becomes greater but reduces
slightly when t increases for large Ic values. Priests prefer mages over warriors when Ic values
are small and prefer warriors over mages when Ic values are large. For large Ic, priests’ relative
preference on warriors over mages decreases along time t. Mages prefer priests over warriors
when Ic is small and prefers warriors over priests when Ic is large. For large Ic, mages’ relative
preference on warriors over priests also decreases along time t.
Group complementarity and economic output
To measure the economic implications of heterophilous preference in socioeconomic networks,
we investigate the relationship between complementarity of professions and economic perfor-
mance. Consider the socioeconomic networkNs(Ic, t) of a virtual society with intimacy thresh-
old Ic on day t. Economic production utilizes virtual money and goods that are converted to a
standardized currency (see Materials and Methods). For each member avatar a in Ns(Ic, t), we
calculate her production output in the week from t − 6 to t, denoted as Ys,a(t). The economic
performance of the avatars in Ns(Ic, t) is defined as the output per capita,
Ys(Ic, t) =
1
#Ns(Ic, t)
∑
a∈Ns(Ic,t)
Ys,a. (5)
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One measure of profession complementarity can be defined as the sum of preference measures
between the three types of avatars,
Ps(Ic, t) =
∑
j 6=i
Ps,ij(Ic, t). (6)
Alternatively, we can measure complementarity by determining how much the real collaborator
configuration qs,ij deviates from the optimal collaborator configuration γijws,j (see Materials
and Methods). The lower the deviation, the higher the degree of complementarity. Thus, we
have
Cs(Ic, t) ≡
[
3∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
(qs,ij − γijws,j)
2
]− 1
2
. (7)
To make these results comparable for different virtual worlds, we investigate the rela-
tive quantities between two societies in the same world, lg(P2k−1/P2k), lg(C2k−1/C2k) and
lg(Y2k−1/Y2k), rather than focusing on each society separately. Both measures of complemen-
tarity correlate strongly with the relative economic output when t and I are not large (Fig. 3A-
F). For the first few days (small t), most avatars strive to achieve higher levels by implementing
specific tasks with small economic outputs. Other avatars attempt to obtain high intimacy lev-
els by killing monsters in locations unrelated to economic outputs. In both cases the avatars
intend to form complementary collaboration networks, but their activities are not focused on
economic outputs. With the development of a virtual world, the number of active avatars in-
creases and reaches a maximum at time tmax and then decays (Fig. 3G). When the activity level
of a virtual world decreases, the intent of the avatars moves away from production and the col-
laboration structure is increasingly unrelated to economic activities. This is consistent with the
fact that the spectrum of tmax has a distribution similar to the significant correlations between
complementarity and economic output (Fig. 3H).
Discussion
Overwhelming empirical evidence has shown that most social networks are homophilous. The
probability that two nodes will connect is higher if they share similar traits. Our analysis of
virtual worlds in which division of labor is operative demonstrates the important role of com-
plementarity. In those socioeconomic networks individuals have the motivation to cooperate,
and in the formation of the network individuals exhibit a heterophilous preference for those
with complementary productive skills. Although mapping human behavior in virtual worlds
to real-world human behavior is a subtle process (33), we believe that they share an intrinsic
commonality because avatars in virtual worlds are, in fact, controlled by real-world people.
In particular, avatars consciously form teams to accomplish tasks more successfully and ef-
fectively. More generally, growing evidence shows significant similarities in the behaviors of
online avatars and real-world humans (22, 34–41)
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In reality, human’s preference is multidimensional in their traits (13). The situation in virtual
societies is a little different. Indeed, the way people interact with each other has significantly
changed from the old days, particularly due to the impact of internet. In modern time, people
can meet through internet in the virtual world instead of physically getting together to dine,
drink, and talk to forge ties. Personal traits become less important in virtual societies while
avatars’ profession skill is identified as a dominating trait in virtual society.
The economic model proposed in this work is different from the one in (12). The essential
difference is in the assumption of the utility function. Also, we have used a modified method
of model calibration. Moreover, our model allows us to determine not only if i-avatars are
homophilous or heterophilous but also the preference of one type of avatars to any other type of
avatars. Hence, our model is more general and can be applied to other systems.
The relationship between social networks and economic output has been studied previously.
It has been found, for example, that the diversity of individual relationships within a community
strongly correlates with the economic development of the community (42) and is directly asso-
ciated with higher productivity for both individuals and the community (43, 44). Because, to
date, detailed real data at the population level of societies have been unavailable, this correspon-
dence between professional skill and economic performance has not been quantified. Here we
have begun to fill this data gap and also to highlight the usefulness of virtual worlds in carrying
out research in economics and sociology (22). One direct indication of our findings is that if
a team leader or a firm manager recruits new members according the complementarity of their
skills, the team’s productivity will increase and the firm’s economic well-being grow.
Supplementary Material accompanies this paper at http://www.scienceadvances.org/.
Materials and Methods
Data description
We use a huge database recorded from K = 124 servers of a popular MMORPG in China to
uncover the patterns characterizing virtual socioeconomic networks. In a virtual world residing
in a server there are two opposing camps or societies. Two avatars can choose collaborators,
and a measure of closeness called intimacy is assigned to the collaboration link. When two
collaborators in the same society collaborate to accomplish a task, their intimacy level increases.
Two avatars from different societies can also collaborate, but their intimacy level remains zero.
Hence the social networks of the two camps are essentially separate. We can regard the two
camps as two societies, thus giving us S = 248 virtual societies. For convenience, s = 2k − 1
and s = 2k stand respectively for the two societies in the same virtual world k. Two avatars are
defined as collaborators if they both are on the collaborator list and their intimacy exceeds Ic.
We consider many temporal collaboration networks. On day t in a virtual society s, a network
Ns(Ic, t) is a network in which the intimacies of all edges are no less than a threshold Ic, which
can be disconnected (Fig. 1A).
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In each society there are three professions (warrior, priest, and mage). We use subscripts 1,
2, and 3 to stand respectively for the three professions: warrior, priest and mage. For simplicity,
we define several notations as follows. An s-avatar is an avatar belonging to society s. An
i-avatar is an avatar having profession i. Similarly, an i-collaborator is a collaborator having
profession i. An (s, i)-avatar or (s, i)-collaborator is an i-avatar or i-collaborator in society s.
An economic model of collaboration formation
If there is no collaboration preference, the proportion of (s, j)-collaborators that an (s, i)-avatar
has is identical to the proportion of j-avatars in the group, that is qs,ij = ws,j . Hence the
number of (s, j)-collaborators of an (s, i)-avatar is f rnds,ij = fs,iws,j. In a virtual society with a
preset division of labor, an avatar prefers collaborators with complementary skills. We assume
that, for an (s, i)-avatar, there is an optimal configuration of collaborators with different skills,
f opts,ij = γijfs,iws,j, where the preference coefficients γij are independent of society s. The utility
of an (s, i)-avatar increases when her/his real number fs,ij of (s, j)-collaborators approaches the
optimal value f opts,ij and reaches its maximum Umaxs,i = bf
β
s,i when her/his collaborator configura-
tion is optimal such that fs,ij = f opts,ij . According to the law of diminishing marginal utility, we
have β < 1. Therefore, the utility function of an (s, i)-avatar is
Us,i = bsf
β
s,i − asf
α
s,iX
β−α
s,i , (8)
where
Xs,i =
[
3∑
j=1
(qs,ij − γijws,j)
2
] α
2(β−α)
(9)
and γij is the preference of (s, i)-avatars for (s, j)-avatars. If i-avatars do not have any prefer-
ence on j-avatars such that qs,ij = ws,j for all societies, we have γij = 1. If i-avatars prefer
j-avatars, we have γij > 1. If i-avatars prefer not to collaborate with j-avatars, we have γij < 1.
For {i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3}, if γij > γik, then i-avatars prefer j-avatars over k-avatars. To maintain
a collaboration network of size fs,i, the (s, i)-avatar suffers a cost proportional to fs,i (12),
Ms,i = csf
β
s,i. (10)
According to the above model, the overall utility in the decision-making process is
Ds,i(fs,i) = Us,i −Ms,i = (bs − cs)f
β
s,i − asf
α
s,iX
β−α
s,i . (11)
Model calibration
An (s, i)-avatar solves the following decision-making problem of how many collaborators to
have
max
fs,i
Ds,i(fs,i). (12)
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It follows that
fs,i = [asα/(bs − cs)β]
1
β−α Xs,i. (13)
Note that the γij values are affected only by the professions and remain the same for different
societies. This enables us to estimate the parameters.
The solution (13) denotes the average behavior (decision) of all avatars having the same
profession in a given society. If we consider an arbitrary avatar a, we must add a noise term (12),
fs,i;a = [asα/(bs − cs)β]
1
β−α Xs,i + εa, (14)
which means that the “realized” number of collaborators avatar a has is the sum of a universal
(or systemic) term and an idiosyncratic error term. The error term is assumed to have mean 0 and
variance σ2. Note that this assumption states that the variance of any avatar of any profession is
the same.
We denote Ns as the size of society s and ws,i as the fraction of i-avatars in society s. Hence
the number of i-avatars in society s is Nsws,i, and the expectation of the aggregated number of
collaborators that i-avatars have in society s is Nsws,ifs,i. According to Eq. (14), we have
Nsws,ifs,i = Nsws,i
[
asα
(bs − cs)β
] 1
β−α
Xs,i + Es,i, (15)
where Es,i has mean 0 and variance (Nsws,iσ)2 = (Nsws,i)2 σ2.
It follows that, for i 6= j,
ws,iNsfs,i − Es,i
ws,iNsXs,i
=
ws,jNsfs,j − Es,j
ws,jNsXs,j
. (16)
For society s, the error is
Ψs,ij = ws,iNsfs,iws,jNsXs,j − ws,jNsfs,jws,iNsXs,i
= N2sws,iws,j(fs,iXs,j − fs,jXs,i) (17)
= Es,iws,jNsXs,j −Es,jws,iNsXs,i. (18)
According to Eq. (18), we find that the mean of Ψs,i,j is 0 and the variance is φs,ijσ2, where
φs,ij = (ws,iNs)
2 (ws,jNsXs,j)
2 + (ws,jNs)
2 (ws,iNsXs,i)
2
= N4sw
2
s,iw
2
s,j
[
(Xs,i)
2 + (Xs,j)
2] (19)
Thus the normalized variable Ψ2s,ij/φs,ij has mean 0 and variance σ2 for any society s. The sum
of squared errors (Q2i,j) over all societies in the sample is
Q2ij =
S∑
s=1
Ψ2s,ij
φs,ij
=
S∑
s=1
(fs,iXs,j − fs,jXs,i)
2
(Xs,i)
2 + (Xs,j)
2 , (20)
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which is independent of Ns as expected. However, Q2ij is dependent on ws,i, which is consistent
with the setup of our model but different from the model in Ref. (12). Thus the total sum of the
squared errors is
Q2 = Q212 +Q
2
13 +Q
2
23. (21)
One can see that as, bs and cs could be society-specific and are not included in the final objective
function of model calibration.
For each pair of Ic and t, a society is excluded in model calibration if the number of avatars
having at least one collaborator is less than 500 to ensure that ǫa has enough realizations. Chang-
ing this threshold around 500 results in same results. In addition, if the number of societies
included in a model is less than 50, we do not calibrate the model because the model has 10
parameters.
To find the solution to the minimization of Q2, the taboo search algorithm is adopted (45).
The solution space is restricted to 0 ≤ γij ≤ 2 for i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and α2(β−α) > 0. Because there
are 10 free parameters, it is not easy to reach the global minimum. We thus perform a taboo
search in each cell of a 9-dimensional lattice of size 29 with the constraint that 0 ≤ γij ≤ 1 or
1 ≤ γij ≤ 2. The parameters in certain cell corresponding to the minimum of Q2 in all cells are
obtained as the solution. The normality assumption of fitting errors has been verified by QQ-
plots, which rationalizes the setup of the model. We note that the partitioning of the solution
space into a 9-dimensional lattice of size 29 is very important. If we perform the taboo search
directly, the resulting Q2 value is significantly larger and the three preference curves γij(t) for
each i are not well separated around γij = 1 (cf. Fig. 2).
Significance tests
To test whether the preference coefficient γij of i-avatars to j-avatars is significantly different
from the no-preference case, we perform F -tests using the null hypothesis
H0 : γij = 1, i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} . (22)
Following Ref. (12), the F -statistic is
F =
SSRcon − SSRuncon
puncon − pcon
/
SSRuncon
n− puncon
, (23)
where SSR is the sum of squared residuals of the best-fit calibration, p is the number of model
parameters, n is the number of observations, while the subscript “con” indicates the constrained
model under the null hypothesis and the subscript “uncon” the unconstrained model.
Economic output of individuals
There are two virtual currencies, Xingbi and Jinbi. Xingbi cannot be produced by an avatar’s
activity and can only be bought from the system, which has an approximately stable exchange
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rate in reference to the Chinese currency Renminbi. Xingbi is thus a universal currency across
different virtual worlds. Jinbi, on the other hand, is produced by the economic activities of the
avatars. There is a built-in exchange platform in each virtual world so that avatars can exchange
Xingbi and Jinbi. In this way, there is a real-time exchange rate from Jinbi to Xingbi.
An avatar can produce virtual items (e.g., weapons, clothes, and medicines) and a limited
amount of the virtual currency Jinbi. We convert the produced items and Jinbi to Xingbi to
obtain the real economic output of each avatar on each day. There is a marketplace in each
virtual world in which avatars can sell their items that are priced in Xingbi or Jinbi. The price
of an item is determined by the average price of all the trades in the marketplace on a given day.
Each produced item can thus be measured in Xingbi.
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Figure 1: Empirical evidence of heterophily in the socioeconomic networks of virtual societies
on a typical day t = 15. Warriors, priests and mages are marked respectively in cyan, red
and blue. (A) Networks of 27 avatars randomly chosen from a virtual society filtered by three
intimacy thresholds Ic = 0, 100 and 2000 (top to bottom). (B) Dependence of qs,ij on relative
size ws,j for all virtual societies for Ic = 100. In each plot, there are three well isolated clusters.
For most societies, qs,ij > ws,j when i 6= j and qs,ij < ws,j when i = j. (C) Dependence of
preference measure Ps,ij on relative size ws,j for all societies for Ic = 100. There are also three
well separated clusters in each plot. For most societies, Ps,ij > 0 when i 6= j and Ps,ij < 0
when i = j. (D) Evolution of the averaged preference measure Ps,ij over all virtual societies
for Ic = 100. The preference measures are roughly persistent.
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Figure 2: Preference coefficients γij for socioeconomic networks with the intimacy threshold
being Ic = 100. (A) Daily evolution of the nine preference coefficients γij with i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The color of a point (t, γij) is determined by j: cyan, red and blue for j = 1, 2 and 3, respec-
tively. The nine points for a given t were determined simultaneously in one calibration. (B) Box
plots of γij shown in A.
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Figure 3: Relation between complementarity of collaboration network and economic output.
(A) Examples of correlations between lg(P2k−1/P2k) and lg(Y2k−1/Y2k). (B) Examples of cor-
relations between lg(C2k−1/C2k) and lg(Y2k−1/Y2k). (C) The p-value of the correlation between
lg(P2k−1/P2k) and lg(Y2k−1/Y2k) for different values of Ic and t. A give grid (t, Ic) is colored
as red or yellow if the correlation is significant at the 0.001 level or the 0.01 level. Otherwise,
the grid is colored as green. (D) The p-value of the correlation between lg(C2k−1/C2k) and
lg(Y2k−1/Y2k). (E) Correlation coefficient ρ between lg(P2k−1/P2k) and lg(Y2k−1/Y2k) for dif-
ferent values of Ic and t. The correlation coefficient is set to be zero is the correlation is insignif-
icant at the 0.01 level. (F) Correlation coefficient ρ between lg(C2k−1/C2k) and lg(Y2k−1/Y2k).
(G) Evolution of the number of active avatars in different virtual worlds. (H) Histogram of tmax
which is the date that a virtual world has historically the maximum active avatars.
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